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ABSTRACT
Rent-control advocates argue that its strongest feature is offering tenants strong protections from
economic displacement. Nonetheless, rent control may have negative effects on tenants, as
previous research has shown that these tenants have longer commutes and higher unemployment
rates because they are incentivized to stay in place even after their location is no longer optimal.
I study what happens to tenants when they are displaced from their rent-controlled apartments by
exploiting a California law called the Ellis Act that allows landlords in Los Angeles and San
Francisco to evict tenants even if they are lease-compliant, under the condition that all the
tenants in the building must be evicted at once and are compensated by the landlord with
substantial relocation payments. In large apartment buildings (five units or more), these Ellis Act
evictions act as an exogenous shock because these landlords are unlikely to be evicting all their
tenants just to target an individual household. Using Infutor data, I identify over 900,000 people
who lived in a five-plus unit rent-controlled apartment in either San Francisco or Los Angeles in
1999, 11,470 of whom were evicted between 2000 and 2007. I find that evicted tenants were less
likely to stay in their original city and more likely to live in lower-income and lowerintergenerational-mobility neighborhoods than control tenants. The negative effects of these
evictions appear to be highly persistent: neighborhood socioeconomic status is lower for the
evicted group than the control group at least 12 years ex post. These findings support that the
Ellis Act imposes steep costs on tenants and may be partially undermining California’s recent
attempts to improve housing affordability and stability.
JEL Classification Codes: J26, J22, J21, R23
Key Words: Rent control, evictions, neighborhood mobility, Mahalanobis matching
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Introduction
California’s ongoing challenge to provide mass afordable housing has fueled concerns
that middle- and working-class families are getting priced out of high-opportunity areas.
Afordable housing advocates claim that California has a law on the books that is only
making a bad problem worse: the Ellis Act. This highly controversial law allows landlords,
usually with rent-controlled buildings, to evict all of their tenants and withdraw the building
from the housing supply, even if all the tenants are lease-compliant. The Ellis Act may
thus be undermining California’s attempts to shield renters from escalating housing costs,
such as its 2019 statewide rent-control ordinance, as previous research has shown that rentcontrolled landlords are more likely to use the Ellis Act when their rents go up (Asquith,
2019a). However, there is very little empirical evidence of the impact of an Ellis Act eviction
on tenants, leaving policymakers with an incomplete idea of how important it is to reform
this law.
In this paper, I generate new evidence on the consequences of losing a rent-controlled
apartment via an Ellis Act eviction by examining how it changed people’s mobility and
location patterns. I generate causal evidence by exploiting the requirement in the Ellis
Act that all tenants must be evicted. Tenants get at least 120 days to vacate, and in
some cases receive relocation payments,1 but a key provision is that the landlord cannot
selectively remove tenants: all must go. I argue (and show evidence thereto) that landlords
in sufciently large apartment buildings—specifcally, fve-plus-unit buildings—could not
optimize their decision to use the Ellis Act just to target one tenant household. Thus, Ellis
Act evictions are an exogenous displacement shock to tenants in sufciently large buildings,
causing them to quasi-randomly lose their rent-controlled units.2
1

Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood mandate that landlords
must give Ellis’d tenants relocation payments. These can be substantial, ranging from about ∼$13,000 to
∼$20,000, depending on the city.
2
This is not to say that the landlord’s choice to do an Ellis Act eviction is random. As shown in Asquith
(2019b), Ellis Act and other no-fault evictions are more likely to occur when rents rise. However, as long as
Ellis Act evictions are independent of each household’s personal circumstances, it functions as an exogenous
displacement shock.
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One reason that the impact of an Ellis eviction on tenants is unclear is that the evidence
on displacement’s long-run impact on people is mixed: whether it is negative or positive (in
economic terms) depends on context. For example, gentrifcation-pressured out-migrants do
not seem measurably worse of (Brummet and Reed, 2021), but tenants evicted for being
out of compliance with their leases do seem to sufer deleterious efects (Collinson et al.,
2022). However, a much broader literature encompassing other displacement events, such as
the U.S. government’s Japanese interment program (Arellano-Bover, 2022), displacements of
Germans and Poles after World War II (Becker et al., 2020; Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka,
2013), and Hurricane Katrina evacuees (Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt, 2018), fnds a mix
of both positive and negative economic efects on the displaced.
One reason that displacement may yield some positive economic results is that displaced
people are often forced to reoptimize their employment and location decisions for themselves
and their children (Chyn, 2018; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005).
Tenants with rent-controlled apartments may be particularly likely to reoptimize this way,
as prior studies have shown that rent control encourages people to prioritize keeping their
controlled apartments over shorter commutes (Krol and Svarny, 2005; Gross, 2020) or seeking
the best job match (Svarer, Rosholm, and Munch, 2005). Further, California and municipal
policies give Ellis’d tenants an adjustment cushion, both in terms of relocation payments
and a long minimum notice period of 120 days. These factors may help displaced tenants do
better on certain economic outcomes than comparable non-evictees. On the other side of the
ledger, because rent control encourages landlords to reduce their housing supply (Asquith,
2019b), largely by converting to owner occupancy (Diamond et al., 2019), tenants can fnd
it much harder to fnd a new, comparable apartment locally if they have no reason to seek a
new job. Thus, it is hard to know from frst principles how deleterious an Ellis Act eviction
is on individual tenants.
To study how Ellis Act evictions impact displaced tenants, I leverage individual address
histories ofered by Infutor Data Solutions. The Infutor data are from a commercially avail-

2

able data set that longitudinally tracks individuals’ migration histories within the United
States using publicly available information. I match the Infutor data to property records
provided by county assessors ofces and CoreLogic Solutions, which allows me to construct
a comprehensive sample of people who were living in a fve-plus-unit building in either Los
Angeles or San Francisco in 1999. From that starting point, I can follow their residential
histories until 2019. I use Ellis registration data from the San Francisco Rent Board and the
Los Angeles Housing Community and Investment Department to identify which buildings
had Ellis Act eviction notices issued over the 2000–2007 time period, and am thus able to
assign treatment and control status based on whether the building did or did not receive a
notice. Overall, I build a large control sample of about 907,465 individuals and a smaller,
but still substantial, treated sample of 11,470 individuals.
Unfortunately, the Infutor data do not have high-quality information on individual-level
outcomes, such as income or occupation. Thus, I proxy for whether an Ellis Act eviction
had a negative or positive impact on evictees by comparing how neighborhood-level measures
difer between the treatment and control groups after an eviction. I get these neighborhoodlevel outcomes from the Neighborhood Change Database, which reports 2000 Census data in
2010 Census Tracts. Additionally, because my study design involves a large, never-treated
control group, a treatment group that gets treated at diferent times (i.e., a staggered rollout design), and a very long ex post observation period of 12+ years, I account for possible
contamination bias using the event study regression method of Sun and Abraham (2021).3
Their method ensures unbiased weighted averages of treatment efects across all relative time
periods, and I report results from their method as my preferred specifcation.
My regressions thus generate estimates of the efect of receiving an Ellis Act eviction
notice on various measures of neighborhood quality, and have a causal interpretation under
the assumption that Ellis Act evictions in large buildings were efectively independent of
3

A recent literature has pointed out that naively using ordinary least squares to estimate event studies in
the presence of staggered treatment times is very likely to produce coefcient estimates biased by treatment
efects from other relative time periods. Sun and Abraham’s method accounts for this potential bias and
circumvents it. See their paper for greater discussion.

3

tenant characteristics. I present strong evidence that there is no selection into treatment on
most observable building or individual characteristics for buildings with fve or more units,
and there is clear evidence that buildings in whiter, wealthier neighborhoods were more likely
to be Ellis’d. This is almost surely because these buildings were most likely to be targeted for
condo conversion, not because landlords are discriminating against better-of white tenants.
I thus correct for the diference in initial conditions by using propensity score matching to
rebalance my sample.
I estimate results for fve outcomes. First, I look at outcomes related to job access:
whether a person remains in their original local labor market, defned as either the San
Francisco or Los Angeles commuting zones (Abbreviated as CZ; Tolbert and Sizer, 1996);
and their probability of living in a census tract with long (> 25 minutes) commutes. Second,
I look at changes in overall neighborhood socioeconomic status (SES) by estimating changes
in the neighborhood median household income of the treated group. Further, while the
Infutor data do not include moves for children, I quantify whether Ellis’d people move to
areas with higher or lower intergenerational economic mobility using the Opportunity Atlas
(OA) Census tract income data (Chetty et al., 2020). The OA income measure captures the
average expected income attained of people who grew up in a given 2010 Census tract by
the time they reach their midthirties.
I fnd in almost every analysis that an Ellis eviction does steeply increase the annual
probability of moving—not just in the period the notice was received, but on a sustained
basis. I also fnd across specifcations that individuals became less likely than the control
group to remain in their original labor market after being Ellis’d. I also fnd that the treated
group sorts into lower SES neighborhoods ex post, as measured both by adult outcomes
(median household income) and the children’s future incomes (OA incomes). Treated adults
fnd themselves living in neighborhoods with about 3 percent lower median household incomes and living in neighborhoods where their children can expect to make about 1 percent
less than the control group 12 years after receiving an Ellis notice. Overall, being Ellis’d
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makes people more likely to move out of the SF or LA metro areas altogether (and thus
likely forcing them to change jobs) and relocate to somewhat poorer neighborhoods.
Primarily, this paper contributes to a recently reinvigorated literatures on evictions
(Desmond, 2012; Collinson et al., 2022) and rent control’s impact on tenants (Diamond
et al., 2019; Gross, 2020; Autor, Palmer, and Pathak, 2019; Asquith, 2019b). Secondarily,
this paper also hopes to generate additional evidence on adult outcomes after displacement
in hopes of pointing the way forward on resolving several outstanding empirical debates on
the value of job access and neighborhood efects for adults. The current evidence indicates
that adults’ labor market outcomes change little when they move to new neighborhoods,
but neighborhoods can infuence physical and mental health, as well as subjective well-being
(Chyn and Katz, 2021). However, most of these studies have focused on the lowest-income
adults, because the key empirical difculty is fnding real-world examples of random (or
quasi-random) shocks to people’s locations. Thus, the literature on the short- and long-run
consequences of moving individuals across geographies has focused on policy experiments or
one-of events. The Ellis Act, by contrast, has generated thousands of displaced individuals across urban California since the 1980s and continues to do so today. By introducing
these evictions to the literature, I hope to spur further studies harnessing the Ellis Act’s
power to act as an informative natural experiment on the value of location and the impact
of displacement on individuals and their families.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the Ellis Act
and other relevant legal points. Section 2 discusses the Infutor, property, and census data.
Section 3 outlines how I generate causal, unbiased estimates of the impact of receiving an
Ellis Act eviction notice. Section 4 reviews the results of the analysis. The paper concludes
in Section 5.

5

1

Key Institutional Details
The Ellis Act was enacted into law by the California State Legislature on July 1, 1986, in

response to the 1984 California Supreme Court Case Nash v. City of Santa Monica,4 where
17-year-old landlord Jerome Nash sued the city of Santa Monica for the right to evict all his
tenants and demolish the rent-controlled apartment building his mother had helped him buy.
Santa Monica had recently passed a rent-control law that also included restrictions on either
demolishing or converting controlled units to condominiums. While Nash admitted he could
achieve a “fair” return under Santa Monica’s laws, he claimed that Santa Monica’s laws
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of his property without due compensation, saying:
“There is only one thing I want to do, and that is to evict the group of ingrates
inhabiting my units, tear down the building, and hold on to the land until I can
sell it at a price which will not mean a ruinous loss on my investment.” (Nash v
City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97 (1984))
The California Supreme Court ruled against Nash, asserting that municipalities had a
right to regulate their housing supply and that Santa Monica’s regulations did not amount
to a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the California
Legislature efectively overruled the California Supreme Court by enshrining into law the
right for a landlord to go out of business by evicting all of their tenants. Local municipalities
could no longer prevent landlords from exercising their rights to leave the rental business,
but were allowed to regulate Ellis Act evictions via notice requirements, relocation payments,
and other restrictions. The legislature later amended the Ellis Act in the 1990s to require
that landlords give at least 120 days notice to tenants of eviction and to allow cities with rentcontrol ordinances to enforce these on the Ellis’d buildings if the landlords put them back on
the rental property market after two years of being withdrawn. Further, if a landlord seeks
to return the vacant building to market within 10 years of pursuing an Ellis Act eviction,
4

California Legislature (1986), p. 570-571.
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the landlord must give the evicted tenants the right of frst refusal to their original unit.
Initially, relatively few landlords used the Ellis Act. However, by the late 1990s, housing
values in California had steadily risen, causing the opportunity cost of having a controlled
property relative to having an uncontrolled property to rise.5 The Ellis Act became an
increasingly popular means for landlords to vacate rent-controlled properties, which can
command a higher sales price in rent-controlled jurisdictions.

1.1

Municipal Ellis Restrictions

In addition to the Ellis Act, San Francisco has additional regulations on Ellis Act evictions. San Francisco started imposing relocation payments for Ellis Act evictions in February
2000, but initially only for low-income tenants and for those where the household included
someone who was aged 60+, disabled, or had a minor child. Los Angeles as well imposes
some additional requirements on Ellis Act evictions. First, Los Angeles passed laws in February 1986 (partly to anticipate the Ellis Act) that mandated relocation payments for no-fault
evictions. Relocation payments are paid out to each unit’s house household but can vary
in amount by each individual tenant’s age, disability status, income, the presence of minor
dependent children, and how long the tenant has been in their unit. More information, including a timeline of changes to the relocation payments and other relevant policy changes,
can be found in Asquith and Reed (2021).

2

Data
Information on Ellis Act evictions comes from the Los Angeles Housing Community and

Investment Department (HCIDLA) Custodian of Records and the San Francisco Rent Board.
These eviction records were linked to individual buildings using public and private property
records. In San Francisco, I obtained annual property records from the San Francisco County
5
For example, in San Francisco, just 5 buildings were Ellis’d in 1995. By comparison, between July 1998
and June 1999, 205 buildings were Ellis’d (Castillo, 2001).
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Ofce of the Assessor-Recorder, which has digitized property records for every parcel in the
city from 2003 to the present. In Los Angeles, these data came from the Los Angeles County
Ofce of the Assessor, with digitized annual records from 2006 to the present. These data
include information such as property classifcation (residential or not), number of units, and
year built. I use these variables to establish whether a building is multifamily, large (defned
as fve or more units), or rent controlled.6 Los Angeles eviction records were linked directly
to the property records by their unique parcel number. For years prior to 2003 in San
Francisco, I used a parcel crosswalk provided by the San Francisco Department of Planning
to backfll in properties that might have been demolished or converted to condos between
1998 and 2003. For Los Angeles, I backflled in the property panel by assuming that there
were no major changes to the existing stock of buildings over this time period. This lowered
my match rate between the property panel and the list of Ellis’d buildings, with the most
important consequence of making my treatment group somewhat smaller than it otherwise
could be. The San Francisco eviction data do not include the parcel number the Ellis Act
eviction occurred in, so I performed an exercise to match the SF Rent Board’s eviction
address records to building parcel ID numbers.7
This linkage allowed me to identify my potential treatment buildings (rent-controlled
buildings that fled an Ellis Act eviction notice with their respective cities) and control
buildings (rent-controlled buildings that did not Ellis their tenants). I then linked longitudinal individual address histories from Infutor Data Solutions to determine which individuals
were living in the treatment and control buildings. Infutor creates these histories using sev6

In San Francisco, a building is rent controlled if it has two or more units and was built before June 13,
1979. In Los Angeles, the cutof date is for buildings built before October 1, 1978.
7
I describe this process more in Asquith (2019b). It is a difcult exercise, because buildings may be listed
under several addresses, particularly large buildings that front multiple streets. Further, parcel numbers are
often changed after an Ellis Act eviction when the landlord then changes the use type of the now-vacant
building. For example, an apartment building has one parcel number, but in a condo association, each condo
gets its own parcel number, refecting that each is a unique, separable property. If a building were to be
Ellis’d in January 2003, then by June 2003 (when the assessor generates its annual cross-section of the city’s
properties), the only matches in the assessor’s records for the address of the Ellis’d building will be for all of
the successor condos. You would thus need access to historical parcel records to fnd out what the original
parcel number was.
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eral public and private sources, such as USPS change of addresses, county assessor records,
magazine subscriptions, or white page listings. Since these data are intended to be sold
to direct marketers, they tend to be high quality and are reported down to the unit level.
Addresses are assigned an estimated arrival date, and individuals have some limited demographic information, namely age (for only about one-third of the observations) and gender
(for about 85 percent of the observations). Previous work has shown that the data closely
match the census’s over-25 population at the tract level, without substantive diferences in
coverage by tract characteristics (Asquith, Mast, and Reed, 2021; Diamond, McQuade, and
Qian, 2019; Phillips, 2020).
After matching people to buildings via addresses, I then mapped treatment and control
group status from buildings to individuals. Since Ellis Act evictions occurred in the most
substantial numbers in Los Angeles and San Francisco between 2000 and 2007, my sample
is comprised of tenants living in either a treatment or control building in 1999.
Table 1 shows Ellis Act eviction counts of impacted buildings, units, and people by city
and year, from 2000 to 2007. In total, 11,470 people were identifed as living in a building
in 1999 that would go on to receive an Ellis Act eviction notice between 2000 and 2007.
Eviction notices reached their height during the housing boom, as many landlords moved to
clear out buildings in hopes of ultimately converting the units to condos, particularly in Los
Angeles.8 This treated group is reasonably large, and it is set against a vastly larger control
sample of 907,465 individuals who were living in 36,258 non-Ellis’d buildings.9
Figures A1 and A2 are maps showing how the treatment and control buildings are distributed within San Francisco and Los Angeles, respectively. Figure A1 shows that the large
8

See, e.g., Hymon (2006); Zahniser (2006). San Francisco likely saw less of a spike of Ellis Act evictions
during this time, because the city only allowed landlords of two-to-six-unit buildings to condo convert via
an annual lottery. Buildings with seven or more units are not allowed to condo convert at all. In 2013,
the lottery was suspended until 2024, but two-unit buildings were allowed to condo convert under certain
ownership restrictions (Asquith and Reed, 2021).
9
After 2007, the number of Ellis Act evictions falls signifcantly. While they pick up again before the
COVID-19 Recession, they do not reach the heights observed during the housing boom. To avoid possible
contamination from buildings that were treated later, I drop all buildings that were Ellis’d between 2008
and 2019.
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apartment buildings are concentrated largely in northern and eastern parts of San Francisco,
with a particularly large concentration of both treatment and control buildings in downtown
San Francisco (the northeast corner) and the Mission District (central east section) parts of
the city. Figure A2 shows that these apartment buildings were reasonably evenly distributed
across Los Angeles. In Section 3.1, I quantify how the treated buildings are distinct from
the control buildings.

2.1

Race Assignment

Following Diamond, McQuade, and Qian (2019), I employ a two-step procedure to assign
an imputed race/ethnicity category to individuals from the Infutor data set. The frst step is
to use the NamePrism algorithm, an ethnicity/race classifcation program primarily intended
for academic research (Ye et al. 2017). NamePrism uses frst and last names to compute
probabilities an individual is non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic white, Hispanic, non-Hispanic
Asian or Pacifc Islander (API hereafter), non-Hispanic American Indian or Alaska Native,
or non-Hispanic of two or more races.10 The second step uses Bayes’s rule to update the
name-based probabilities exploiting the local race/ethnicity distribution in the census block
of the building the tenant lived in when the individual frst enters the sample.
Specifcally, the second step involves updating each tenant’s baseline racial/ethnic probabilities with the 2000 racial/ethnic distribution of the census tract of their initial in-sample
building. This information comes from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), which
reports census data from 1970 to 2010 in standardized 2010 census tract geography. As in
Diamond et al. (2019), I then use Bayes’s rule to obtain posterior probabilities for the six
classifcations.11 I assign a person to a given racial category if their posterior probability for
10

NamePrism uses a training data set of 74 million labeled names from 118 diferent countries, representing
90 percent of the world’s population. They then map these to a taxonomy of 39 leaf nationalities, and
condense this down further to the six racial/ethnic categories used by the U.S. Census Bureau.
11
For both San Francisco and Los Angeles, I use the subset of census tracts that actually contain one of my
in-sample buildings. Census tracts in San Francisco are perfectly coterminous with its municipal boundaries,
because it is a consolidated city-county, but not in Los Angeles. For these, I do a spatial merge to determine
what fraction of a given tract’s land area is within Los Angeles’s municipal boundaries, and use this fraction
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that category is at least 80 percent.

2.2

Neighborhood Data

I also analyze outcomes based on various neighborhood characteristics drawn from the
NCDB, where neighborhood is defned as being synonymous with their census tract. I focus
on the neighborhood’s 1999 median household income as my chief neighborhood outcome of
interest. I also use median household income as a way to examine heterogeneity in response to
displacement—i.e., are outcomes diferent for people displaced from high-median household
income versus low-median household income tracts?
While I cannot directly observe the locations of children, I measure how displacement
might have likely impacted their long-run outcomes by using data from the OA, a project
that used tax data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to quantify intergenerational
income mobility by census tract (Chetty et al., 2020). The OA uses census and IRS data
to frst identify where children born between 1978 and 1983 grew up, and then use their
incomes at the ages of 31–37 (corresponding to their mean incomes in 2014 and 2015) to
calculate what these children made on average as adults. The authors also perform these
calculations by race and gender, by parents income rank, and for other outcomes, such as
incarceration and teenage pregnancy rates. From the OA, I chiefy use the children’s average
adult incomes, both overall and by race, as my outcome of interest. Thus, estimating an
Ellis notice’s impact on the adult’s neighborhood’s OA income helps indicate whether people
are moving to high (or low) opportunity areas for their children, separate from whether they
are moving to higher or lower SES areas for themselves.

2.3

Description of the Pooled Data Set

Table A3 reports the mean and standard deviation of my outcomes of interest: whether
the individual moved (“Moved”); whether the individual still lives in their initial sample
as a weight in the calculation of posterior probabilities.

11

CZ (“In Sample CZ”), which proxies for whether they are able to stay in their same local
labor market and thus keep their job after receiving an Ellis notice; whether the person has
a long commute, defned as being 25 minutes or longer (“Long Commute”);12 the median
1999 household income (in 2020 dollars) of the initial census tract the individual lived in
(“Median HH Income”); and the income (in 2020 dollars) at age 35 of the people who grew
up in that neighborhood (“OA Income”) drawn from the Chetty et al. (2020) OA.
I report these mean outcomes overall (specifcally, across all the fve-plus-unit rentcontrolled buildings) and by selected subsamples. About 4.6 percent of the sample moves
annually, and about 94 percent of the sample stays in their original CZ over the entire study
period (1999–2019). The average neighborhood has about 51 percent of the residents facing
a long commute; the average neighborhood median household income is about $59,400; and
those who grew up in there can expect to make about $44,300 by the age of 35.
The other subsamples I report include by people’s initial (1999) tenure in their buildings;
by race; for those living in the bottom half of tracts sorted by 1999 median household income;
and those living in the top half of tracts sorted by the diference between 1999 median
household income and OA income–capturing which tracts had the highest upside potential
for children relative to adult incomes. The means here vary substantially by subgroup.
Whites have the highest OA and median household incomes, highest moving rates, and
lowest attachment to the SF and LA community zones (CZs). People with the shortest
tenures move the most, and those with the longest tenures live in the neighborhoods with
the highest median household incomes, but otherwise people look fairly similar across tenure
length. It is key to note here that the average median household income in the low-income
neighborhoods is $45,616—while this is around $14,000 below the sample average, this fgure
would have been close to the median income in many other neighborhoods throughout the
United States in 1999. This refects that incomes, and housing costs, are particularly high
12

In the 2000 Census, self-reported commute times are top coded at 25 minutes. While this is the best
metric available for this analysis, San Francisco and Los Angeles are infamous for having particularly long
commutes for residents, so some important variation may be lost.
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in these two cities, even 20+ years ago.

3

Empirical Strategy
I study the impact of an Ellis Act evictions as an exogenous shock to residence in a rent-

controlled apartment and then compare the outcomes for the evictees against a large sample
of tenants who were not evicted. I generate causal estimates of the treatment efect under
the assumption that these evictions are quasi-randomly assigned to tenants in sufciently
large buildings, so that it was impracticable for landlords to target an Ellis Act eviction at
individual tenants based on their personal circumstances or characteristics. Under this assumption, ex post diferences in outcomes can be attributed to the efects caused by receiving
an Ellis Act eviction notice.
To study the impact on outcomes Yit , I frst specify a base event study regression model:

Yit = α +

19
X

b(i),g

β e=g−t Eit

+ Xit θ + δt ×T ractb(i) + δi + ϵit ,

(1)

e=−8

b(i),g

where Eit

is a dummy variable for whether individual i in year t received an Ellis Act

eviction notice in building b(i), where b(i) indexes the building each individual lived in
their initial period, and g indexes the building’s eviction (treatment) year. Functionally, g
indexes the year treatment was frst received, called hereafter the treatment cohort. The
regression includes nonparametric controls for time-invariant characteristics via fxed efects
for individuals (δi ), which also subsumes fxed efects for the initial in-sample buildings (δb(i) ).
I also include initial tract of residence-by-year fxed efects (δt ×T ractb(i) ), which control for
annual shocks to neighborhoods. This also subsumes controls for city- or state-level policy
changes that could have impacted the treatment efect, such as city-level adjustments to Ellis
Act relocation payments. Xit has vectors for the building’s average residential tenure and
for the number of years since person i frst moved into b(i) out to a fourth-order polynomial,
which controls for how the length in residence may infuence outcomes. Some specifcations
13

augment Xit with vectors of age out to fourth-order polynomial and dummies for whether
an individual qualifes as an “elderly” tenant in their initial city.13 These age-based controls
are not included in every regression because, as mentioned above, age is only observed for
about a third of the sample.
Thus, βe measures the net impact of receiving an Ellis Act eviction notice on each person’s
outcomes e time periods either before or after the eviction occurred. Specifcally, the net
efect accounts for not just the subsequent displacement event (if it occurred), but also any
relocation payments or assistance the evictee might have received. The key identifcation
b(i),g

assumption for a causal interpretation of β e is that the assignment of Eit

is independent

of pretreatment individual-level outcomes.
For three reasons, the results may be biased nonetheless, even if this assumption holds.
One reason is that eviction at the level of the building itself is nonrandom, because these
landlords are likely responding to local neighborhood price signals. This nonrandomness
from location efects can translate into the composition of the treatment and control groups
looking quite diferent on observables, inasmuch as tenant SES characteristics correlate with
the neighborhood’s SES characteristics. This could bias the results because moves in the
treatment group are then going to mechanically look quite diferent than the control group.
To make this problem more concrete, let’s assume that the treatment group lives in higherincome neighborhoods than the control group on average. Were two otherwise completely
identical individuals from each group then move to a neighborhood at the exact citywide
average, the diference in income levels between the origin and destination neighborhoods is
going to mechanically be wider for the treated individual.
The second reason is that the control group may not actually serve as a proper counterfactual for how the treatment group would have fared if they had not been evicted, either
because tenants in the treated buildings are actually being targeted even at higher unit
counts or because the control group and treatment groups were evolving along fundamen13

In San Francisco, tenants aged 60 and over are entitled to additional relocation payments. In Los
Angeles, it is those aged 62 and over.
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tally diferent paths even prior to eviction. The last reason is that a recent literature has
shown that the event study regression given in Equation (1) can yield biased estimates of βe
when efects from other time periods contaminate the time period of interest when there is
treatment efect heterogeneity across treatment cohorts. I address all three possible sources
of bias.

3.1

Addressing Imbalance between Treatment and Control Groups

Panel A in Table 2 illustrates the problem of imbalance between treatment and control
groups by showing mean values of key characteristics for individuals at base year by treatment
and control status, the diference between them, and the p-value for that diference. I report
these separately for San Francisco and Los Angeles in Appendix Table A1.14
In general, the two samples difer meaningfully on several observable individual and
neighborhood characteristics. In part, this is driven by the large size of the sample, ensuring
that most diferences are statistically signifcant at the 1 percent level. Nonetheless, it
is qualitatively clear that some of these diferences are indicative of diferential landlord
behavior between the treatment and control sample.
The frst diference is that the treated units are much smaller—about 13 fewer units than
in the control sample (33 versus 46). Appendix Figures A3 and A4 confrm that people in the
largest (50+ units) and smallest (2 unit) multifamily buildings are relatively less likely to get
Ellis’d, but people in the 4- to 8-unit range were particularly likely. The treatment buildings
as well are about fve years older than the control buildings. These diferences track with
what we know about incentives under the Ellis Act. Older buildings in cities with sufciently
high housing prices are going to be more attractive to redevelop (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005;
Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009; Rosenthal, 2014), making them more attractive for landlords
to Ellis. Further, bigger buildings are going to be, on balance, less attractive to Ellis not only
14

From Table 1, the treated share of the population is very small—1.2 percent of the pooled sample; 0.8
percent of the San Francisco sample; and 1.3 percent of the Los Angeles sample. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, summary statistics for the control group can be taken as the baseline summary statistics for the
sample as a whole.
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because total relocation payments increase with each unit, but also because the probability
that at least one tenant will litigate the eviction in court increases with each unit as well.
Other diferences support the idea that neighborhood characteristics matter in addition to
building characteristics. Buildings slightly farther away from their downtowns (“Ln(Distance)”)
were more likely to be Ellis’d.15 Also noteworthy is that the treated sample is 21.2 percent
whiter than the control sample (57.2 percent versus 47.2 percent), located in neighborhoods
with fewer people having long commutes (49.4 percent versus 51.0 percent) and higher median household incomes ($64,635 versus $58,316). While it is theoretically possible that
landlords were using the Ellis Act to discriminate against white, better-of tenants, the most
likely explanation is that tenant characteristics correlate with neighborhood characteristics,
and older, smaller buildings in whiter, wealthier neighborhoods were the most attractive
targets for redevelopment that an Ellis Act eviction would hasten.
These diferences in means are not uniform across the two cities. Table A1 reveals that
San Francisco and Los Angeles are idiosyncratically imbalanced. For example, the San
Francisco sample is fairly well racially balanced, with no statistically signifcant diferences
in the shares of whites, Hispanics, and APIs, but the unit count gap between treated and
control groups is a yawning 47.5 units (7.2 versus 54.7). In Los Angeles, by contrast, the
treated sample is markedly whiter than the control sample (55.6 percent versus 41.2 percent),
but the diference in unit counts is only 9.6 (33.2 versus 44.8).
These diferences in treatment versus control neighborhoods, buildings, and (ultimately)
people mean that the results could be biased, because an Ellis Act eviction may mechanically force people to move to poorer neighborhoods in a kind of mean reversion. Second,
because the treated group comes disproportionately from the smallest buildings where the
identifcation assumption is weakest. I address this issue frst by using propensity score
matching (PSM), which will generate inverse probability weights (IPWs) to simulate random
assignment to treatment based on the covariates (including unit count), and then directly
15
Distance from downtown is measured in meters as the distance from the individual building and each
city’s respective City Hall.
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examining if there is any evidence that there is diferential selection into treatment by unit
count.

3.2

Propensity Score Matching

I address the imbalance in neighborhood and individual socioeconomic characteristics by
using PSM to create probability weights that simulate randomizing treatment status based
on observable characteristics. While there is not a canonical approach to creating weights
using PSM in panel fxed efects settings, Arkhangelsky and Imbens (2022) point out that
they can be created in cross-section and then used across all time periods for each unit.16
To calculate the PSM weights, I use each individual’s initial observation as the basis for
my cross-section. This ensures that the sample is balanced at least in the initial period,
making it more likely that the treatment and control groups are balanced throughout the
nP
o
b(i)
b(i)
pretreatment period. With slight abuse of notation, I defne Ei = 1
t Eit > 0 , i.e.,
a dummy variable for whether a person is ever subject to an Ellis Act eviction. The weights
are generated using the following logit regression:
b(i)

b(i)

logit(Ei ) = π0 + π1 T enureit(i) + π2 AvgT enureit + π3 W hitei + π4 AP Ii + π5 Hispanici
b(i)

+ π6 Blacki + π7 U nitCounti
b(i)

π9 LATi

b(i)

+ π10 LON Gi

b(i)

+ π8 Y earBuilti

(2)

+ InSF Interactionsi χ + γT ract(i) + ηit(i)
b(i)

where T enureit is the person’s tenure in building b(i) in 1999; AvgT enureit is the average
tenure of all the tenants in building b(i) in 1999; and W hitei , AP Ii , Hispanici , and Blacki
represent the four major racial groupings of interest in this paper: non-Hispanic whites,
Asian and Pacifc Islanders (API), Hispanics of any race, and blacks. I also include four
b(i)

other building-level variables. U nitCounti

b(i)

and Y earBuilti

are building b(i)’s unit count
b(i)

and year built, respectively. I also control for building b(i)’s latitude (LATi

) and longi-
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I also note that Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) adopt this approach in their groundbreaking paper on
a doubly robust approach to staggered treatment roll-out designs.
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b(i)

tude (LON Gi ) to (imperfectly) make the building better balanced on location.17 Lastly,
InSF Interaction collects the interaction terms between a dummy indicating whether the
building is in San Francisco and the other variables. These interaction terms recognize that
the substantive diferences between the SF and LA samples discussed above that may predict
b(i)

selection into treatment.18 I then use the predicted probabilities, Êi , generated by (2) to
create IPWs via the following stepwise function:

Wi =









b(i)

1
ˆ b(i)
E
i

if Ei

1
b(i)
1−Êi

if

b(i)
Ei

=1
(3)
=0

Table 2 Panel B shows the balance of building and individual characteristics after applying
the IPWs. It’s immediately clear that the matched sample is better balanced between the
treatment and control groups. For example, the average unit count across buildings for the
treated group is now 35.8 versus 33.6 in the control group, with a p-value of 0.88, indicating
that there’s no statistical diference between these averages. A similar pattern emerges for
year built (p-value for the diference between treatment and control now 0.113) and percent
API (p-value now 0.138). The log of the average distance to downtown is now almost
identical between the treatment and control groups, meaning that the two groups are now
more similarly distributed spatially. While there’s little improvement on median household
and OA incomes overall, this is an improvement over Panel A, as it is particularly important
that the samples look similar in terms of building characteristics, given that selection into
treatment occurs at the building level.
17

Nearest-neighbor matching using Mahalanobis distance would probably yield a more accurate match
between the treatment and control groups, but the econometrics literature has not yet determined how to
generate heterogeneity-robust event study estimates after matching by this method.
18
Another important reason to do this is that the two cities have somewhat diferent policy environments
surrounding the Ellis Act that may nonlinearly infuence selection into treatment. These interaction terms
account for these diferences better than could a simple dummy variable for whether the building is in San
Francisco.
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3.3

Pretrends and Robustness

Next I address whether my control group serves as a proper counterfactual for the treatment group. I begin by showing the qualifed existence of parallel trends between the treatment and control groups in the data with the IPWs applied.
Appendix Figure A5 shows mixed evidence of parallel pretrends. Mean outcomes for the
treatment group are very unstable, relative to the control group, in the frst six pretreatment
years. This is driven by the nature of the staggered roll-out design. For example, only the
group treated in 2007 contributes to measuring the mean outcomes at event time e = −8.
Similarly, trends in the treatment group again become very unstable starting at event time
e = t + 13, because event time e = 13 is when some treatment groups (specifcally, the 2007
treatment cohort) stop contributing to the average. I address this issue by narrowing the
estimation scope to cover just e = −2 through e = 12.19
That said, accounting for the jumps caused by the staggered rollout design, there is some
clear evidence in favor of both parallel pretrends and that receiving an Ellis notice causes
people to change residences. Figure A5 Panel A shows a clear spike in the probability of
moving at e = 0 that persists through at least e = 3. Similarly, focusing on just the period
covering pre-periods e = {−1, − 2} shows some stabilizing once enough of the treatment
groups start contributing to the averages. Neighborhood median household income rises for
both the treatment and control groups between e = −2 and e = −1 by similar amounts. If
you exclude the 2000 treatment group, which enters the sample at e = −1, then the yearon-year changes between e = −2 and e = −1 for average neighborhood median household
income are 0.0037 log points for the control group and 0.0027 log points for the treatment
group. Similarly, average neighborhood OA incomes rise by 0.0002 and 0.0004 over that
same time period for the two groups respectively. For being the original CZ, these fgures
are −0.0096 and −0.0058. While not exactly the same, the changes have similar magnitudes
19

I retain e = 2 even though not all cohorts participate, because it is important to show a lack of pretrends
in at least one pretreatment period. Typically, the coefcient on e = −1 is set to zero, leaving just e = −2
as my sole eligible pretreatment period.
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as well as the same sign. Only for moving are these fgures divergent: −0.0035 and 0.0024
for the treatment and control groups, respectively. However, given the very large spike in
moving observed at e = 0, it is fairly clear that the Ellis notices are generating a moving
efect that is independent of whatever “false positive” nonparallel pretrends might generate.
I next empirically test my assumption that tenants in fve-plus-unit apartment buildings
are not likely to be targeted for eviction based on their individual characteristics. For rentcontrolled landlords, the most important factor determining how much rent they can collect
is based on the tenant’s length of tenure. All else being equal, the longer the tenure, the
steeper the discount between the tenant’s contract rent and the rent the landlord could
collect on the vacant unit (Basu and Emerson, 2000). Thus, the lowest unit count where
landlords seem to stop discriminating based on length of stay ofers the best opportunity
to generate a sufciently large sample of treated people whose treatment status is assigned
independently of their personal characteristics.
To identify the right cutof, I split the sample by building unit count into 11 groups for
unit counts 2 through 12. I then run a logit regression that tests various individual- and
building-level characteristics on their probability of predicting the individual being Ellis’d:
b(i,U =u)

logit(Ei

b(i)

) = ψ0 + ψ1 T enureit(i) + ψ2 AvgT enureit + ψ3 W hitei + ψ4 AP Ii
b(i)

+ ψ5 Hispanici + ψ6 Blacki + ψ7 Y earBuilti
b(i)

+ ψ9 LON Gi

b(i)

+ ψ8 LATi

(4)

+ γT ract(b(i)) + ηit

where U is the unit count of building b, u = {2, 3, . . . , 12}.
Appendix Figure A6 shows the results of regressing Equation (4) and reports the values
of ψ1 in Panel A and the values of ψ2 in Panel B for each value of u. Overall, Appendix
Figure A6 shows strong empirical support for the fve-unit cutof assumption. Panel A shows
tenure does not predict being treatment at any unit count, reinforcing that landlords do not
use the Ellis Act to target individual tenants. Panel B shows that the building’s average
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tenure negatively predicts being Ellis’d in four-unit buildings, but the efect is slight. By
u = 5, the efect is no longer statistically signifcant at the 5 percent level.20 Overall, there
is little evidence that longer-staying tenants are targeted for eviction. While there is some
evidence that landlords in four-unit buildings become less likely to Ellis their tenants as
average length of tenure rises, this efect loses signifcance in fve-unit buildings, and more
or less disappears in six-plus-unit buildings. Thus, I proceed with using fve-unit buildings
as my cutof, but in Section 4.2, I present results from both two- and six-unit buildings and
show that changing building size does not meaningfully change the results.

3.4

Estimating Unbiased Average Treatment Efects on the Treated

While the relative rarity of Ellis Act evictions means that it is advantageous to exploit
multiple years’ worth of evictions to boost the study’s power, recent econometric studies
have determined that a staggered treatment rollout design (wherein diferent units receive
treatment at diferent times) can generate biased estimates of the average treatment efect
on the treated (ATT) when there are heterogeneous treatment efects across treatment times
and cohorts.
In an event study context, I am interested in calculating an unbiased estimate of the
cohort-specifc average treatment efect on the treated (CATT) e time periods from the
initial treatment for each cohort g using the Sun and Abraham (2021) method, where each
CAT Tg,e represents the cohort-specifc average treatment efect on the treated e time periods
from the initial treatment of units in cohort g. I then supplant the biased βe ’s from Equation
(1) with the weighted average of the CATTs across treatment cohorts as:

ve =

1 XX
CAT Tg,e P {Gi = g|Gi ∈ [−e, T − e]}
|L| e g

(5)

where e is (as above) a set of relative periods, e = {−2, −1, . . . , 12}, and L collects the
20

While not presented in this paper, the coefcients on the other characteristics also tend to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero. These results are available on request.
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disjoint sets of e, or L = ∪e e. Gg is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a unit’s frst
treatment year is equal to g. I use the STATA program developed by Li (2021) to calculate
the empirical analog of ve , v̂e , for each of my outcomes of interest.

4

Results
I frst confrm that receiving an Ellis notice causes people to relocate. It is critical to

establish that I can empirically observe a spike in moving contemporaneous with being issued
an Ellis Act notice because my data are not administrative. It is also important qualitatively
to check the magnitude of this efect, because a large spike in moving at event time e = 0 is
strong evidence that most treated tenants actually relocate.21
Fortunately, Figure A7 shows that the annual moving rate increases by 4.8 percentage
points immediately (i.e., at event time e = 0). The baseline moving rate in the control
sample is 4.6 percent, according to Appendix Table A3, so being Ellis’d more than doubles a
tenant’s annual probability of moving. This elevated treatment efect exists even well after
the notice is issued: treated tenants are 4.1 percentage points more likely to move at e = 1,
and the treatment efect persists at an average of 4.1 percentage points per annum thereafter.
Without question, receiving an Ellis notice did induce people to move and very likely caused
treated tenants to become persistently more mobile even well after the notice was received.
With that in mind, Figure 1 shows the results for whether the tenant remains in their
original labor market; the share of people in their tract of residence with a “long” (> 25
min) commute; the logged 1999 median HH income of their neighborhood; and the logged
OA income for their neighborhood. In lieu of more precise individual-specifc measures, the
general idea is that the frst two act as proxies for access to jobs, either in the sense that
people were able to stay in the same labor market after being Ellis’d (P r(InSampleCZ))
or that they did not have to accept substantially longer commutes to keep the same job
21

Ex ante, one should not expect vˆ0 here to be very close to 1, because some Ellis notices were fought in
court and some tenants as well get extra time to vacate the building based on their characteristics.
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(P r(Commute > 25mins)). The two neighborhood income measures proxy for the economic
mobility of adults after an Ellis Act eviction, and the change in the OA income proxies more
directly for how an eviction altered the expected adult incomes of evicted kids. While adults’
incomes are generally less responsive to these sorts of neighborhood efects than kids’ (see
e.g., Nakamura et al., 2021; Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007; Chyn, 2018), the ability to
fnd a job can be infuenced by neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics (Hellerstein,
Kutzbach, and Neumark, 2013; Asquith et al., 2021).
Panel A shows unambiguously that the treated group became steadily less and less likely
to be in their original local labor market as time goes on relative to the control group.
Interestingly, it appears that the treated group initially tries to stay in their original local
labor market for the frst few time periods ex post: vˆ0 is only 0.1 percentage points and
is not statistically signifcant, while vˆ1 and vˆ2 are equal to just −0.8 and −0.9 percentage
points and only signifcant at the 10 percent level. Thereafter, however, the treatment efect
steadily declines until it reaches −2.6 percentage points by e = 12. Since 90.2 percent of
the control sample is still in their original CZ 12 years or more ex post, then the treated
group is only about 2.9 percent less likely. While this is not a major diference, it is notable
because workers in the San Francisco and Los Angeles labor markets command some of the
highest average wages (Diamond and Moretti, 2021), making it quite likely that a small but
signifcant share of tenants had to take lower-paying jobs after being Ellis’d. More research
is needed to understand employment changes within the same CZ after an eviction.
This does not necessarily mean that the treated sample as a whole had to see a new job or
that those who did were worse of on every dimension. Figure 1 also shows the results for the
average commute time in the neighborhood of residence. It shows that while treated tenants
initially move to neighborhoods with a higher share of the residence taking long commutes,
this efect drifts down to a precise zero between e = 1 and e = 4, before rebounding to a
very slightly positive number between 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points for the rest of the study
period. Essentially, the treated group’s ex post location decisions look no diferent than the
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control groups on this dimension, even accounting for the fact that many members of the
treated group had to relocate at least once.
By contrast, Panel B shows strong evidence that treated tenants moved to poorer neighborhoods and that this efect is very persistent. While the treated group starts of in slightly
better-of neighborhoods by both measures ex ante, they start to sort into worse neighborhoods even by e = 0, with vˆ0 being equal to −0.006 and −0.004 log points for median
household income and OA income, respectively. This efect grows to −0.013 log points by
e = 5 for the OA income neighborhood measure before retreating slightly and stabilizing
around −0.011 log points, while for median household income, the efect continues to grow
until e = 8 when it reaches −0.031 log points and stabilizes thereafter around that level.
These results imply that treated tenants were sorting into neighborhoods where the median
adult could expect to make $1,841 less than the neighborhoods of the control group. Similarly, using the average neighborhood OA income level of $44,320 from Appendix Table
A3, this implies that the children of treated tenants wound up in neighborhoods where they
could expect to make $576 less per year by the time they were 35 than the children of control
tenants.
Overall, the evidence indicates that evicted tenants initially react by fnding apartments
in neighborhoods that have broadly similar commute times as their originating neighborhoods, but are nonetheless in poorer neighborhoods. Some of this efect may be a mechanical
one due to people moving out of the SF and LA commuting zones, where most neighborhoods
are going to have lower median household incomes. It is very likely that the draw of these
poorer neighborhoods for evictees is that prevailing rents are more likely to be similar to
the rent-controlled discounted rents they were paying in their originating apartments than
the prevailing rent for a vacant apartment in the same originating neighborhood. While the
decline in neighborhood SES for the evictees is stark, the silver lining is that the adults appear to have been targeting neighborhoods whose upper mobility penalty for their children
was substantially smaller than the implied penalty for the adults themselves. While this
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study can only observe neighborhood-of-residence changes to the treated group, Figure 1
presents strong evidence that Ellis Act evictions left the average evictee living in a neighborhood with lower SES than if they had not been evicted, and more likely to have left the
high-compensation, high upward mobility SF and LA metro areas altogether.

4.1
4.1.1

Heterogeneity by Individual Characteristics
Results by Tenure in Unit

I next explore Ellis treatment efects for various subgroups. I focus on efects by tenure
and by race. Ex ante, one would generally expect that those with longer tenures would be the
most likely to experience downward neighborhood mobility, because they would be the most
likely to fan out into poorer neighborhoods to fnd rents closest to the ones they were paying
before the eviction. However, one should be cautious in interpreting the tenure efect, because
it is likely confounded with the tenants’ age: longer tenures are mechanically associated with
being older, all else being equal. Higher age and tenure also predict having greater wealth,
both because people tend to make more money with age and because longer-tenured tenants
with rent control are going to be able to build wealth faster. Greater wealth could cushion
the efect of the eviction, meaning that is possible that efects on the longest-tenured tenants
may be attenuated.
Figure 2 shows the results by three tenure groups: those initially living in their apartments
for less than three years; for between three and six years; and for more than six years. Figure 2
shows indeed that tenants of the shortest tenures did not experience downward neighborhood
SES mobility, nor did they generally have to move to neighborhoods with higher shares of
residents taking long commutes. While there is evidence that they did wind up leaving the
SF and LA local labor markets, they only become statistically less likely to be living in these
CZs at e = 4, probably coinciding when the efect of being in a rent-controlled apartment
prompts signifcantly higher attachment in the control group.
For the middle-tenure group, there is no evidence that they are any more or less likely
25

to leave the SF or LA CZs than the control group, even 12 years ex post, but this group
nonetheless appears to move to lower SES neighborhoods upon being Ellis’d, and the difference between the treated and control groups magnifes over time. The results for this
group are strong evidence that the decline in neighborhood SES observed in Figure 1 is not
being driven solely by people who move to diferent CZs. For at least this group of tenants,
they compensate for being evicted by moving to a poorer neighborhood where rents are
presumably lower.
The longest tenured group, by contrast, is both more likely to leave their home CZ as well
as initially settle into lower SES neighborhoods. The efect of relocating out of their original
CZ is quite persistent: at e = 12, treated tenants are 5.3 percentage points less likely to be
in their original CZ than the control group. However, unlike for the middle-tenured group,
the longer-tenured group shows evidence of reverting back to neighborhoods with similar
median household and OA incomes as the control group. By e = 7, the diference in OA
incomes is no longer statistically signifcant, and by e = 12, the coefcient itself is quite close
to zero. For median household income, the diference is no longer statistically signifcant at
the 5 percent level at e = 12, and v̂12 is just −0.030 versus −0.037 for v̂8 .
The most plausible explanation for the diferences between the middle-tenured versus
longer-tenured groups is that middle-tenured people are those most exposed to negative
displacement efects, because they fall into a gray zone where they have not lived in a
rent-controlled apartment long enough to enjoy a heavily discounted rent but also have not
risked staying in an apartment past the income-maximizing optimal tenancy. This group thus
appears the most tied to their CZ for a variety of reasons, and fnds the easiest adjustment
margin to be moving to a new neighborhood with lower incomes and thus (likely) lower rents.

4.1.2

Results by Race

Figure 3 shows results for four major racial groupings: non-Hispanic whites, APIs, nonHispanic blacks, and Hispanics. The results across racial groupings show some pretty pro-
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found diferences in outcomes. Non-Hispanic whites have the strongest evidence of downward
neighborhood SES mobility: at period e = 0, treated whites have sorted into neighborhoods
with 0.005 lower median HH income log points as well as 0.009 lower OA income log points,
although only the latter is statistically signifcant. These diferences with the control group
continue to grow all the way through the end of the summary period until they are 0.034
log points and 0.025 log points lower than the control group for median HH income and OA
income, respectively, by e = 12. Some of this efect may be driven by people leaving the SF
or LA metro areas for other CZs, where median incomes are almost always lower, as Panel A
shows that treated whites also sort out of their original CZ at a growing rate so that treated
whites are almost 5 percentage points less likely to be living in their original CZ by e = 12.
In contrast, all non-white groupings show much stronger attachment to their original local
labor market and weaker evidence of downward neighborhood SES mobility. APIs show the
least amount of evidence for downward neighborhood SES mobility, or really, much of a
change to their overall neighborhood status at all upon being prompted to move. Treated
APIs appear to stay in the SF or LA areas at similar rates to their control group but sort
into neighborhoods with somewhat longer average commutes. Most likely, this represents
a migration from neighborhoods closer to downtown (where gentrifcation pressures may
be stronger) to more outlying areas. While the point estimates on the treated group’s
neighborhood median household income and OA income are negative, the confdence intervals
are wide enough that a null efect cannot be ruled out for most periods ex post.
Hispanics, if anything, show much stronger evidence of suburbanization within their
existing local labor market. Treated Hispanics are more likely than their control group to stay
in the SF or LA areas, with the efect growing to 1.8 percentage points (or about 1.9 percent
more likely) by the end of the study period. As well, they sort into neighborhoods with
longer commutes, and this diference with the control group grows to 0.5 percentage point
more likely by e = 12. In terms of neighborhood SES, Hispanics sort into neighborhoods
with somewhat lower median HH income and OA income (−0.012 and −0.009 log points,
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respectively, at e = 12) than those their control group. However, the median HH income
estimate is only signifcant at the 10 percent level at e = 12, and the estimates at several
time points are not statistically signifcant at all. This suggests that treated Hispanics are
more likely to suburbanize than their control group, but select neighborhoods are not too
diferent from the control group on household income. Nonetheless, the fact that treated
Hispanics sort into neighborhoods where OA incomes are lower is a point of concern, because
it indicates that they may have trouble fnding schools in suburban areas that provide the
same kind of opportunities for their children as the neighborhoods from which they were
displaced.
Blacks, by contrast, seem to show the most resilience to displacement among the four
groups, although it is worth noting again that they are the smallest group in my sample, and
their results are correspondingly quite noisy. Nonetheless, I fnd that treated blacks are more
likely to sort out their original CZ, and this efect strengthens over time. In contrast, they
initially move into neighborhoods with slightly lower shares of long commuters, although this
efect attenuates over time. Similarly, treated blacks initially sort into neighborhoods with
higher median HH incomes: at e = 0, treated blacks are living in neighborhoods with 0.036
log points higher than those in the control group, and this efect is statistically signifcant.
However, the treatment efect peaks around e = 4 and then declines and loses statistical
signifcance so that by e = 12, the treatment efect is only 0.021 log points. Interestingly,
treated blacks do not sort into neighborhoods with higher or lower OA incomes than the
control group. It is disappointing to note that treated blacks sorting into neighborhoods
with higher median incomes and shorter commutes does not automatically mean they sorted
into neighborhoods associated with higher expected adult incomes for their children. This
is clearly an area where more research is needed.
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4.2

Robustness Checks

I next consider some ways the results in Figures 1–3 may be biased in spite of the
steps taken in Section 3, mostly by the fact that Ellis Act evictions are more likely to
occur in whiter, more afuent neighborhoods, even after weighting the sample. I address
the mean reversion issue discussed above in Section 3.1 by trying to show more directly
that the declining neighborhood SES efects found among whites, Hispanics, and middletenured tenants are not an artifact of how the sample was constructed, but are in fact
attributable to the causal efect of being Ellis’d. I thus test the robustness of my main
results in three ways. First, I look at results from buildings in the bottom half of the
median HH income distribution. This will now change the direction of mean reversion from
downward to upward. Next, I check the robustness of my exclusion assumption by adjusting
the unit cut-ofs. Although age is only observed for about half the sample, I add age as a
fourth-order polynomial as a control, as well as a dummy variable for getting additional time
to quit a unit due to being “elderly” according to SF and LA eviction rules.22

4.2.1

Neighborhood Afuence

Since Ellis Act evictions are slightly skewed toward better-of neighborhoods, I look at the
subset of census tracts that are at the bottom half of their city’s median household income
distribution. This in part changes the direction of any mean reversion from downward to
upward. The results are reported for my outcomes of interest in Figure A8a. Panel B shows
little evidence of mean reversion in terms of neighborhood SES: while the estimates are no
longer statistically signifcant at the 5 percent level, the results still show a clear pattern
of people moving to neighborhoods with lower median household incomes, although the
estimates for neighborhood’s OA incomes is closer to zero. The most plausible explanation
remains that displaced tenants move to poorer neighborhoods as they seek housing costs
after the eviction that are close to the rents they were paying for the controlled apartment
22

As mentioned above, this is 60 years and over in San Francisco and 62 and over in Los Angeles.
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from which they were displaced.
Interestingly, this group shows a rising pattern of attachment to their original CZ so that
by e = 12, treated tenants are 0.7 percentage points more likely to be in their original CZ
than control tenants. While there is not enough evidence to draw a frm conclusion on why
this may be, one possibility is that rent control allows people in poorer areas (likely poorer
themselves) more breathing space to do the transition out of expensive San Francisco and
Los Angeles on their own time and with greater resources. Further research is needed here
to better understand this phenomenon.

4.2.2

Unit Counts

The unit cutof was chosen based on fnding the lowest unit count where the coefcient on
tenure and the building’s average tenure was not statistically signifcant and there were no
higher unit counts whose coefcients on these measures are statistically signifcant. However,
this rule itself is based on the assumption that these are the most important observable
variables for a landlord weighing whether to Ellis his or her tenants, and may obscure that
there are unobservable factors that could make the “true” cutof higher or lower. As discussed
above, a higher cutof is likely less biased but will introduce more variance because the treated
sample of individuals shrinks to 9,235. A lower cutof has the converse problem, but the fears
of bias may be overstated: Figure A6 shows no obvious reason to think that people are being
targeted based on their tenure at even the two-unit building level. Thus, I report results for
the sample of people in two-plus-unit buildings and six-plus-unit buildings in Figure A9.
There are few diferences between the results in the two-plus-unit sample, the six-plusunit sample, and the fve-plus-unit main sample reported above. The ex post probabilities of
moving are quite similar across samples. Comparing Subfgure A9b with Figure 1, a higher
cutof produces a somewhat lower probability of being in the original CZ about six years
or more ex post, but the overall trend is quite similar. Further, the two-plus-unit cutof in
Subfgure A9c shows stronger persistence of treated tenants moving to lower SES neighbor-
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hoods than those in the six-plus-unit sample or in the main sample. Overall, though, it does
not appear that including even the smallest buildings would have meaningfully changed the
results, which reinforces the fndings that a landlord’s decision to Ellis his or her tenants
is likely driven by neighborhood price trends and idiosyncratic factors, rather than tenant
characteristics.
With that in mind, I next present results by racial grouping for two-plus-unit buildings.
Since blacks and APIs in particular sufer from potential small sample bias at the fve-plusunit cutof, using all two-plus-unit buildings may recover a better idea of what the treatment
efects on these two groups are without introducing undue bias. Under this change, the
treated number of blacks rises from 235 to 618, and the treated number of APIs rises from
486 to 767. Results in Figure A10 largely confrm those in Figure 3, with some small
but important diferences. Results for whites are almost exactly the same, but APIs now
show a slightly weaker tendency to be out of their original CZ in the latter time periods
(e ≥ 7), mostly due to wider confdence intervals and a somewhat stronger tendency to
be in neighborhoods with lower OA incomes. The most important diference between the
two-plus-unit and fve-plus-unit samples for APIs is that there is no longer any statistically
signifcant evidence that this group moves to neighborhoods with lower median household
incomes. If anything, they initially sort into neighborhoods with higher median incomes at
times t = 0 and t = 1, before settling down to a statistically zero diference with the control
group thereafter.
Blacks show the greatest diferences between the full two-plus-unit sample and the main
fve-plus-unit sample. Their previous tendency to move out of their original CZs and to
neighborhoods with a lower probability of having a long commute vanish: Figure A10d shows
that all of the ex post coefcients on the probability of being in the original CZ are now
statistically indistinguishable from zero, and the coefcients on having a long commute are
now statistically insignifcant from e = 5 onward. The evidence on neighborhood SES quality
is now more mixed. In the main sample, there are no statistically signifcant diferences
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between treated and control groups in terms of neighborhood OA incomes ex post. In
the full sample, treated blacks move into neighborhoods with about 0.01 lower logged OA
incomes than the control group between e = 1 and e = 7, but this efect then goes efectively
to zero from e = 8 onward. Similarly, treated blacks now gradually sort into higher income
neighborhoods than the control group, until by e = 8, they are living in neighborhoods with
0.033 log points higher median household incomes and this efect persists until the end of
the study period. In contrast, the main sample shows a reversed treatment gradient: blacks
initially move into about 0.035 log points higher median household income neighborhoods
between e = 0 and e = 2, before the efect declines and becomes statistically insignifcant
thereafter.
Overall, Figures A9 and A10 confrm that changing the unit cutofs does not meaningfully
change the direction of the results, except in the case of blacks, in part because there may
be signifcant estimation improvements by accessing a larger treated sample.23

4.2.3

Age Controls

I now introduce age controls by including age as a fourth-order polynomial as well as
a dummy variable for whether someone is considered an elderly tenant by their respective
city. This efectively cuts the sample by 62.5 percent but still leaves about 3,274 treated
individuals.24 Figure A11 shows that adding age controls nearly doubles the size of the
treatment efect on moving. The annual probability of moving spikes 8.3 percentage points,
or a 184 percent increase over the baseline, as compared to 4.8 percentage points in the
baseline model presented in Figure A7. While the treatment efect on moving is higher
across all study periods when age controls are added, from e = 10 onward, the treatment
23
However, one should be careful before assuming the estimates for blacks are more accurate in the twoplus-unit sample than the main sample. Lowering the unit cutof may make it much more likely that tenants
are being targeted for their race, so the exogeneity assumption may be violated, introducing bias. I found
no evidence from Equation (4) that being black had a statistically signifcant efect on being selected into
treatment, but the coefcients were positively signed for unit counts two and three.
24
Fortunately, the remaining treated individuals are relatively evenly divided among the three tenure
groups: 992 were living in their units for less than three years in 1999; 1,214 between three and six years;
and 1,069 for more than six years.
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efects converge so that the estimates with and without age controls are quite close. This
strengthens the fnding that treated individuals remain more mobile than the control group
even a decade or more ex post.
Overall, Figure A12 shows that adding age controls does not substantively change the
main fndings by tenure group, but it does alter the trajectories of the treatment path for
some outcomes that is worth commenting on. First, the confdence intervals on almost all
results widen substantially, which means that one should have somewhat less confdence in
these results due to the smaller treated group problem discussed above. While the probability
of living in neighborhoods with longer commutes does not change much, the probability of
staying in one’s original CZ declines much more quickly and sharply. By e = 12, the average
treated person goes from being 2.6 percentage points less likely to be in their original CZ
in Figure 1 to being 5.2 percentage points less likely once age controls are added—a tidy
doubling of the treatment efect.
In contrast, the efects on neighborhood SES substantially weaken. For OA income, the
coefcients become generally somewhat smaller, the confdence intervals somewhat wider,
and those from e >= 10 lose statistical signifcance, but the overall pattern remains the
same as what was reported in Figure 1. For median household income, none of the ex post
coefcients are now statistically signifcant, but nonetheless, a new, distinct pattern emerges
compared to the main fndings omitting age controls. As in Figure 1, the treated group’s
neighborhood median household income steadily declines through e = 8, but then unlike the
baseline version, neighborhood median household income then starts to rise so that by e = 12,
it is only about 0.01 log points lower than the average for the control group, compared to
0.03 log points that is reported from the main sample. Overall, the main story—that people
were more likely to move to neighborhoods with somewhat lower SES status as well as move
out of their original CZ, but not necessarily to further out suburbs—holds up even when age
is explicitly controlled for.
My results by unit tenure are likely the most sensitive to omitting age controls, so I lastly
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present in Figure A13 the results by the same tenure groups as before with the age controls
now included in the regressions. With notable diference that the middle-tenured group (3–6
years) now shows much stronger evidence that they leave their original CZ, the treatment
trajectories tell the same story as the one seen in Figure 2, as the shortest tenured tenants
(< 3 years) and the longest tenured tenants (> 6 years) have pretty similar results as in the
main sample, suggesting that age is mostly not confounding the results for what are likely
the youngest and oldest groups. The main diference is that the evidence that the shortest
tenured group leaves their original CZ grows substantially: this group is now 8.9 percentage
points less likely to be in their original CZ by the end of the study period compared to 2.9
percentage points less likely in Figure 2.
The evidence that the longest tenured group moves to neighborhoods with lower SES
status is weaker once age controls are added: all coefcients on neighborhood median household income are now no longer statistically signifcant, although the point estimates tend
to be a bit larger. Similarly, the negative OA income efect looks more persistent, but not
strongly so, as compared to the main sample.

5

Conclusion
In this paper, I study the consequences on neighborhood mobility of a unique California

law, the Ellis Act, that forces landlords to evict all of their tenants at once if they wish to
leave the rent-controlled business. Los Angeles and San Francisco experienced a large wave
of these evictions between 2000 and 2007, which generates a relatively large treated sample
of over 11,000 tenants and an even larger control sample of over 900,000 individuals that
I am able to identify in a proprietary individual migration history data set. I argue that
for sufciently large buildings, which I defne as having fve or more units, landlords cannot
optimally choose the eviction time just to target any one tenant, so the tenants experience
the Ellis Act eviction as an exogenous shock to their individual circumstances. I am able to
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follow these adults from 1999 until 2019, giving me a long window to observe their ex post
behavior.
My regressions confrm that an Ellis Act eviction does force people to relocate to a new
location, particularly within the frst 2 years of receiving the eviction notice. Further, I fnd
that this efect persists even 12 years later, although at a slightly more attenuated rate. I
fnd that Ellis’d individuals are more likely to leave the San Francisco or Los Angeles labor
markets than the control group, and move to neighborhoods with lower median household
incomes and lower expected adult incomes for the children who grow up in those neighborhoods. Together, these results confrm that receiving an Ellis Act eviction notice is a
disruptive event in spite of recent measures undertaken by both cities to mitigate the efects,
such as mandating relocation payments from landlords to tenants. The most parsimonious
explanation is that in spite of these relocation payments, tenants are forced to fnd apartments in cheaper areas where prevailing rents are similar to the ones they paid at the time
of eviction. Investigations into various subgroups, such as by race or length of tenure in the
unit, reveal that the most negative efects are concentrated among whites, Hispanics, and
those with tenures between three and six years in their units at the start of the sample.
Various robustness checks confrm the main results. Policymakers looking to ameliorate the
situation of Ellis evictees should thus use these results to consider more aggressive actions,
perhaps by mandating larger relocation payments or extending the time tenants have to
leave.
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Figure 1: Initial Results for Building and Neighborhood-Level Outcomes
Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

Figure 1 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) on four outcomes of interest. Panel A shows the
results for the job proximity measures: the probability of being in the tenant’s original commuting zone (CZ)
and their census tract’s share of people having long commutes (defned as greater than 25 minutes long).
Panel B shows the neighborhood income measures: the log of their census tract’s median household and
Opportunity Atlas (OA) incomes. Standard errors are clustered at the building level, with the regressions
are weighted using inverse propensity weights generated by the process described in Section 3.2.
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Figure 2: Results by Initial Tenure Length
(a) Tenure < 3 Years

Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

(b) Tenure 3 − 6 Years

Panel C: Job Proximity Measures

Panel D: Neighborhood Income Measures

(c) Tenure > 6 Years

Panel E: Job Proximity Measures

Panel F: Neighborhood Income Measures

Figure 2 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) on four outcomes of interest grouped by how long people were living
in their apartments when they entered the sample in 1999. Panels A, C, and E show the results for the job proximity measures:
the probability of being in the tenant’s original commuting zone (CZ) and their census tract’s share of people having long
commutes (defned as greater than 25 minutes long). Panels B, D, and F show the neighborhood income measures: the log
of their census tract’s median household and Opportunity Atlas (OA) incomes. Standard errors are clustered at the building
level. The regressions are weighted using inverse propensity weights (IPWs) generated by the process described in Section 3.2,
with the IPWs computed for each tenure group separately.
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Figure 3: Results by Race
(a) Non-Hispanic Whites

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel A: Job Access Measures

(b) Asian and Pacifc Islanders

Panel D: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel C: Job Access Measures

(c) Hispanics

Panel F: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel E: Job Access Measures

(d) Blacks

Panel H: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel G: Job Access Measures

Figure 3 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) on four outcomes of interest by four racial groupings: non-Hispanic
whites, Asian and Pacifc Islanders, Hispanics of any race, and non-Hispanic blacks. Panels A, C, E, and G show the results
for the job proximity measures: the probability of being in the tenant’s original commuting zone (CZ) and their census tract’s
share of people having long commutes (defned as greater than 25 minutes long). Panels B, D, F, and H show the neighborhood
income measures: the log of their census tract’s median household and Opportunity Atlas (OA) incomes. Standard errors are
clustered at the building level. The regressions are weighted using inverse propensity weights (IPWs) generated by the process
described in Section 3.2, with the IPWs computed for each racial grouping separately.

41

TABLE 1
Total In-Sample Ellis Act Evictions from Buildings with 5+ Units by City, 2000–2007
San Francisco
Buildings
Units
People
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
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Total
Ellis
Total
Non-Ellis

Los Angeles
Buildings
Units
People

Buildings

Total
Units

People

12
9
4
4
16
23
21
26

68
58
25
27
99
156
162
184

111
102
28
49
131
277
241
340

22
20
18
18
32
150
181
95

414
189
237
196
394
2,130
2,856
1,315

627
365
383
293
533
2,687
3,108
2,195

34
29
22
22
48
173
202
121

482
247
262
223
493
2,286
3,018
1,499

738
467
411
342
664
2,964
3,349
2,535

115

779

1,279

536

7,731

10,191

651

8,510

11,470

8,309

108,951

160,698

27,949

430,726

746,767

36,258

539,677

907,465

NOTE:Table 1 presents the count of all units and buildings withdrawn under the Ellis Act from buildings
with 5 or more units from San Francisco and Los Angeles, as well as the count of people afected by the Ellis
Act.

TABLE 2
Comparison of Ellis’d and Non-Ellis’d Adults at Baseline
Treatment

Control

Dif

p-value

Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Unit Counts
33.06
Year Built
1944.61
Tenure
4.61
Avg Tenure
4.60
Moved
0.060
White
0.572
Black
0.025
Hispanic
0.346
Asian
0.056
Ln(Distance)
8.764
Long Commute
0.494
Med HH Inc
$64,635
Ln(Med HH Inc)
10.97
OA Income
$46,623
Ln(OA Income)
10.72

46.31
1949.33
4.35
4.33
0.076
0.472
0.049
0.402
0.077
8.755
0.510
$58,316
10.87
$44,422
10.67

-13.25
-4.72
0.27
0.26
-0.016
0.100
-0.023
-0.056
-0.021
0.008
-0.015
$6,318
0.10
$2,201
0.05

0.200
0.000
0.085
0.076
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.056
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.002
0.002
0.002

Panel B: Matched Sample
Unit Counts
35.75
Year Built
1942.91
Tenure
4.92
Avg Tenure
4.92
Moved
0.063
White
0.663
Black
0.0137
Hispanic
0.278
Asian
0.046
Ln(Distance)
8.765
Long Commute
0.475
Med HH Inc
$70,404
Ln(Med HH Inc)
11.063
OA Income
$48,817
Ln(OA Income)
10.772

33.62
1944.79
4.59
4.58
0.080
0.568
0.0282
0.349
0.054
8.764
0.491
$62,525
10.943
$46,167
10.713

2.14
-1.87
0.332
0.346
-0.017
0.095
-0.015
-0.072
-0.008
0.001
-0.017
$7,879
0.120
$2,650
0.059

0.877
0.114
0.070
0.055
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.010
0.138
0.581
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000

Table 2 reports the mean values for the treatment and control groups, the diference between them,
and the p-value of diference between the mean values against a null hypothesis of zero. “Long
Commute” represents the share of people who had a commute of 25 minutes or longer; “Med HH
Inc” represents the 1999 median household income; and “OA Income” represents the income at age
35 for those people born between 1978 and 1983 who grew up in that census tract (Chetty et al.
2020).
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Additional Results Appendix
Figure A1: Control and Treatment Buildings by Eviction Year in San Francisco

Figure A1 shows the location of each treatment and control building within San Francisco’s
municipal boundaries. Control buildings are in black squares, and treatment buildings are
in circles and color coded with their eviction year.
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Figure A2: Control and Treatment Buildings by Eviction Year in Los Angeles

Figure A2 shows the location of each treatment and control building within Los Angeles’s
municipal boundaries. Control buildings are in black squares, and treatment buildings are
in circles and color coded with their eviction year.
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Figure A3: Distribution of Ellis’d People by Initial Building’s Unit Count

Figure A3 shows the kernel density of people by their initial building’s unit count. Those
whose initial buildings were Ellis’d between 2000 and 2007 are in transparent red and those
whose initial buildings were not Ellis’d over that period are in solid green.
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Figure A4: Distribution of Ellis’d Buildings by Unit Count

Figure A4 shows the kernel density of the sample buildings’ unit counts. The buildings
Ellis’d between 2000 and 2007 are in transparent red and the non-Ellis’d buildings over that
period are in solid green.
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Figure A5: Pretrends of Selected Outcomes of Interest
Panel A: Pr(Moved)

Panel B: Pr(In Sample CZ)

Panel C: ln(Median HH Inc)

Panel D: ln(Opportunity Atlas Income)

Figure A5 shows the IPW-weighted average diferences between the treatment and control
groups by event time. The graphs account for the staggered rollout design in the treatment
group by frst averaging by treatment cohort, and then averaging across cohorts by cohort
size. The control group’s average is weighted only by each observation’s IPW. Panel A shows
the diferences for the annual probability of moving; Panel B, the probability of being in the
individual’s original commuting zone (CZ); Panel C, the log of the median household income
of the neighborhood of residence; and Panel D, the log of the Opportunity Atlas income
(Chetty et al., 2020) of the neighborhood of residence.
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Figure A6: Selected Covariates’ Efect on Assignment to Treatment by Building
Unit Count
Panel A: Individual Tenure in Residence

Panel B: Building’s Avg Tenure in Residence

Figure A6 shows the coefcient estimates of the efect of the individual’s tenure in their residence (Panel
A) and the building’s average tenure across tenants (Panel B) on their probability of being selected into
treatment, generated by the regression in Equation (4) by building unit count (on the x-axis). Standard
errors are clustered at the building level.
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Figure A7: Baseline Event Study on Pr(Moved)

Figure A7 shows the event study estimates the treatment efect of receiving an Ellis eviction
notice on the probability of having moved over the course of the prior year. Standard errors
clustered at the building level. The regression is weighted using inverse propensity weights
(IPWs) generated by the process described in Section 3.2.
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Figure A8: Results by Neighborhood Income Status
(a) Low Median HH Income Neighborhoods

Panel B: Neighborhood Income
Measures

Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Figure A8 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) on four outcomes of interest frst for people living
in census tracts in the bottom half of the neighborhood median household income distribution. Panel A
shows the results for the job proximity measures: the probability of being in the tenant’s original commuting
zone (CZ) and their census tract’s share of people having long commutes (defned as greater than 25 minutes
long). Panel B shows the neighborhood income measures: the log of their census tract’s median household
and Opportunity Atlas (OA) incomes. Standard errors are clustered at the building level. The regressions
are weighted using inverse propensity weights (IPWs) generated by the process described in Section 3.2, with
the IPWs computed for each subsample separately.
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Figure A9: Results for Diferent Unit Cutofs
(a) Pr(Moved)

Panel A: 2+ Units

Panel B: 6+ Units

(b) Pr(Commute >25 mins) and Pr(In Original CZ)

Panel C: 2+ Units

Panel D: 6+ Units

(c) Ln(Median HH Inc) and Ln(OA Income)

Panel F: 2+ Units

Panel G: 6+ Units

Figure A9 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) on fve outcomes using frst all rent-controlled
buildings with two or more units and then all buildings with six or more units. Panels A and B show the
results on the annual probability of moving for the two samples. Panels C and D show the results for the job
proximity measures: the probability of being in the tenant’s original commuting zone (CZ) and their census
tract’s share of people having long commutes (defned as greater than 25 minutes long). Panels F and G show
the neighborhood income measures: the log of their census tract’s median household and Opportunity Atlas
(OA) incomes. Standard errors are clustered at the building level. The regressions are weighted using inverse
propensity weights (IPWs) generated by the process described in Section 3.2, with the IPWs computed for
each subsample separately.
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Figure A10: Results by Race across All 2+ Unit Buildings
(a) Non-Hispanic Whites

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel A: Job Access Measures

(b) Asian and Pacifc Islanders

Panel D: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel C: Job Access Measures

(c) Hispanics

Panel F: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel E: Job Access Measures

(d) Blacks

Panel H: Neighborhood Income Measures

Panel G: Job Access Mesures

Figure A10 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) on four outcomes of interest in the two-plus
unit buildings by four racial groupings: non-Hispanic whites, Asian and Pacifc Islanders, Hispanics of any
race, and non-Hispanic blacks. Panels A, C, E, and G show the results for the job proximity measures:
the probability of being in the tenant’s original commuting zone (CZ) and their census tract’s share of
people having long commutes (defned as greater than 25 minutes long). Panels B, D, F, and H show
the neighborhood income measures: the log of their census tract’s median household and Opportunity Atlas
(OA) incomes. Standard errors are clustered at the building level. The regressions are weighted using inverse
propensity weights (IPWs) generated by the process described in Section 3.2, with the IPWs computed for
each racial grouping separately.
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Figure A11: Baseline Event Study on Pr(Moved) with Age Controls Added

Figure A11 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) augmented with controls for
tenants’ age on the treatment efect of receiving an Ellis eviction notice on the probability
of having moved over the course of the prior year. Standard errors clustered at the building
level. The regression is weighted using inverse propensity weights (IPWs) generated by the
process described in Section 3.2.

55

Figure A12: Initial Results for Main Outcomes with Age Controls Added
Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

Figure A12 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) augmented with age controls on four outcomes
of interest. Panel A shows the results for the job proximity measures: the probability of being in the tenant’s
original commuting zone (CZ) and their census tract’s share of people having long commutes (defned as
greater than 25 minutes long). Panel B shows the neighborhood income measures: the log of their census
tract’s median household and Opportunity Atlas (OA) incomes. Standard errors are clustered at the building
level, with the regressions are weighted using inverse propensity weights generated by the process described
in Section 3.2.
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Figure A13: Results by Initial Tenure Length with Age Controls Added
(a) Tenure < 3 Years

Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

(b) Tenure 3 − 6 Years

Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

(c) Tenure > 6 Years

Panel A: Job Proximity Measures

Panel B: Neighborhood Income Measures

Figure A13 shows the results from estimating Equation (5) augmented with controls on tenants’ age on
four outcomes of interest grouped by how long people were living in their apartments when they entered the
sample in 1999. Panels A, C, and E show the results for the job proximity measures: the probability of being
in the tenant’s original commuting zone (CZ) and their Census tract’s share of people having long commutes
(defned as greater than 25 minutes long). Panels B, D, and F show the neighborhood income measures:
the log of their Census tract’s median household and Opportunity Atlas (OA) incomes. Standard errors
are clustered at the building level. The regressions are weighted using inverse propensity weights (IPWs)
generated by the process described in Section 3.2, with the IPWs computed for each tenure group separately.
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TABLE A1
Comparison of Ellis’d and Non-Ellis’d Adults at Baseline by City
Treatment

Control

Dif

p-value

Panel A: SF Unmatched Sample
Unit Counts
7.19
Year Built
1917.25
Tenure
5.447
Avg Tenure
5.202
Moved
0.055
White
0.711
Black
0.003
Hispanic
0.146
Asian
0.140
Ln(Distance)
8.663
Long Commute
0.500
Med HH Inc
$94,183
Ln(Med HH Inc)
11.370
OA Income
$55,313
Ln(OA Income)
10.895

54.68
1930.30
4.879
4.880
0.097
0.754
0.012
0.096
0.137
8.663
0.504
$86,313
11.275
$55,072
10.893

-47.49
-13.06
0.568
0.322
-0.041
-0.043
-0.009
0.049
0.003
0.000
-0.003
$7,870
0.095
$241
0.002

0.000
0.000
0.011
0.113
0.000
0.271
0.013
0.146
0.921
0.485
0.699
0.038
0.050
0.857
0.927

Panel B: LA Unmatched Sample
Unit Counts
35.23
Year Built
1947.80
Tenure
4.42
Avg Tenure
4.474
Moved
0.060
White
0.556
Black
0.028
Hispanic
0.370
Asian
0.046
Ln(Distance)
8.775
Long Commute
0.496
Med HH Inc
$59,846
Ln(Med HH Inc)
10.905
OA Income
$45,120
Ln(OA Income)
10.693

44.79
1953.58
4.22
4.218
0.071
0.412
0.056
0.468
0.064
8.775
0.511
$51,480
10.772
$41,760
10.617

-9.56
-5.78
0.205
0.257
-0.011
0.144
-0.028
-0.097
-0.019
0.000
-0.016
$8,366
0.133
$3,360
0.076

0.350
0.000
0.200
0.099
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.530
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Table A1 reports the mean values for the treatment and control groups, the diference between
them, and the p-value of diference between the mean values against a null hypothesis of zero.
“Long Commute” represents the share of people who had a commute of 25 minutes or longer; “Med
HH Inc” represents the 1999 median household income; and “OA Income” represents the income
at age 35 for those people born between 1978 and 1983 who grew up in that census tract (Chetty
et al. 2020).

58

TABLE A3
Mean Outcomes by Group
All

Pr(Moved)
Pr(In Sample CZ)
Long Commute
OA Income
Med HH Inc
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Pr(Moved)
Pr(In Sample CZ)
Long Commute
OA Income
Med HH Inc

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian & PI

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

0.0456
0.940
0.506
44,320
59,387

0.209
0.238
0.0957
11,080
29,474

0.0632
0.908
0.474
50,676
75,367

0.243
0.288
0.0917
11,219
32,310

0.0341
0.975
0.572
30,680
41,368

0.182
0.155
0.0817
5,622
16,401

0.0262
0.967
0.537
38,613
44,946

0.160
0.179
0.0871
6,202
16,819

0.0577
0.943
0.489
48,787
59,501

0.233
0.232
0.102
10,674
30,059

Tenure
1-3 Yrs
Mean
SD

Tenure
4-6 Yrs
Mean
SD

Tenure
7+ Yrs
Mean
SD

Low Med
HH Inc
Mean
SD

0.0570
0.928
0.505
44,075
58,695

0.0284
0.955
0.511
43,650
57,541

0.0503
0.940
0.499
46,248
64,752

0.0357
0.955
0.534
39,976
45,616

0.232
0.259
0.0978
11,030
29,356

0.166
0.208
0.0931
10,754
28,176

0.219
0.237
0.0947
11,611
31,567

0.185
0.208
0.0922
8,845
19,916

Table A3 reports the mean and standard deviation (SD) of the outcomes of interest, by selected subgroups.
“Low Med HH Inc” are those living in census tracts which are in the bottom half of the median household
income distribution in their respective city. “High Opp” are those living in census tracts which are in the top
half of the distribution of tracts’ diference between its OA income and its median household income.

